

Flock Audit Report
Woodland, CA
March 2026

By
Woodland Community Members

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Woodland PD Flock Data Audit

A search is when a user types a license plate number or vehicle characteristics into the Flock system to pull up every time and place that vehicle was captured by any camera on the network — in this case, Woodland's cameras.

Woodland PD Data Highlights

- **Immigration-Enforcement Searches** (ICE / HSI / CBP / Border Patrol): 4,353
- **Federal Agency Direct Access** Searches: 14,979
- **Out-of-State Searches** (SB 34 Violation Risk): 2,632,310
- **“Protest”** Searches: 200+ (includes Out-of-State Protest Searches)
- **“MYOC”** (Make Your Own Case) as Reason: 180 (includes Out-of-State)
- **Total of 4,259 organizations** searched Woodland PD Flock data between 2021 and 2026

Summary of Focused Dataset Findings (highly probable SB 34 and SB 54 violations)

| Focused Dataset | Searches | Summarized Findings |
|------------------------------|-----------|---|
| Immigration Enforcement | 4,353 | Flock searches explicitly citing ICE, HSI, CBP, Border Patrol — conducted by agencies that also search Woodland cameras |
| Federal Agency Direct Access | 14,979 | Searches conducted directly by active federal Flock accounts: FBI, ATF, GSA OIG, Air Force, USPS, Border Patrol |
| Out-of-State Searches | 2,632,310 | Searches by Texas, New York, and Illinois agencies — each querying 3,700–6,849 Flock networks per search |

Woodland PD Data Sharing

| Year | Organizations accessing Woodland PD Flock data | Searches on Woodland Flock data |
|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| 2021 | 47 | 1,311 |
| 2022 | 1700 | 382,671 |
| 2023 | 3248 | 1,581,778 |
| 2024 | 3799 | 3,306,561 |
| 2025 | 355 | 4,555,545 |
| 2026 (to Feb 19, 2026) | 326 (partial year) | 793,153 (partial year) |
| Total | 4,259 | 10,621,019 |

ICE / HSI / CBP - Immigration

Immigration Searches and Reason Stated 4,353 RECORDS (2022–2024) Sample List

| Top Search Reasons (Exact Text) | Count |
|---|-------|
| HSI / hsi / Hsi (all variants) | 800+ |
| ICE / ice | 450+ |
| bp / BP SIG / bp intel / bp sig (Border Patrol) | 400+ |
| HSI Narcs / HSI Narcotics / HSI Interdiction | 290+ |
| HSI INV / HSI Investigation / HSI investigation / hsi inv | 250+ |
| immigration | 120+ |
| CBP case numbers (e.g. cbp187 24-000739) | 120+ |
| Wanted – DHS / DHS 187 | 38 |
| FUGITIVE BP (Border Patrol fugitive) | 2 |

Searches where the reason included immigration

- 128 searches with reason including "immi" such as "immigration", "immigration enforcement", "illegal immigration", by 8 different organizations.
- The vast majority of searches (109) were by Houston TX PD shortly after Trump's inauguration, from 01/23/2025 through 03/04/2025.

Searches where reason is "ICE", "ICE assist", "ERO", similar

At least 492 searches were made by 23 organizations where ICE or a related term was the reason given for the search. The most recent were Anaheim CA PD on 06/12/2025 and Riverside County CA SO 06/29/2025 (Flock Safety updated their software to disallow entering just "ICE" as a reason). Woodland PD are still sharing data with both Anaheim CA PD and Riverside County CA SO.

Search where the reason includes "DHS"

At least 228 searches by 18 organizations, the most recent by Riverside County CA District Attorney 02/05/2026

Searches where the reason includes "homeland"

10 searches, mainly by out of state organizations but also including Riverside County CA SO.

| Organization | Reason | Search.Time |
|--|----------------------|-----------------------------|
| South Sioux City NE PD | Homeland CP Case | 04/13/2023, 02:45:17 PM UTC |
| South Sioux City NE PD | homeland cp case | 04/13/2023, 02:57:58 PM UTC |
| South Sioux City NE PD | Homeland CP Case | 04/13/2023, 03:34:19 PM UTC |
| Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles (Ohio DPS) | Assist Homeland Sec. | 06/13/2023, 11:55:34 AM UTC |
| Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles (Ohio DPS) | Assist Homeland Sec. | 06/13/2023, 12:00:08 PM UTC |
| Riverside County CA SO | homeland inv | 09/19/2023, 05:42:49 PM UTC |
| Riverside County CA SO | homeland inv | 09/19/2023, 05:43:02 PM UTC |
| Fort Worth TX PD | homeland | 09/29/2023, 07:17:43 PM UTC |
| Riverside County CA SO | homeland security | 02/04/2025, 05:46:53 PM UTC |
| Riverside County CA SO | homeland security | 02/04/2025, 05:47:41 PM UTC |

Searches where the reason includes "HSI" (possibly referring to Homeland Security Investigations, operating under ICE)

2516 searches by 138 agencies.

The most recent searches were 2/10/2026 and each reference a request for assistance from HSI:

| Org.Name | Time.Frame | Reason | Search.Time |
|----------------------------------|---|--|-----------------------------|
| Kings County Sheriff's Office CA | 07/01/2025, 06:00:01 PM UTC 02/10/2026, 09:00:01 PM UTC | Drugs/Narcotics - HSI- CDTF analyst request for case assistance | 02/10/2026, 08:52:08 PM UTC |
| San Bernardino County CA SO | 01/11/2026, 12:30:09 AM UTC 02/10/2026, 12:30:09 AM UTC | Burglary/Breaking & Entering - Train burglary case to assist Arizona HSI CA Gardiner | 02/10/2026, 12:21:12 AM UTC |

Menifee CA PD was the most prolific searcher with this term and many California organizations that Woodland PD are still sharing data with are using this reason to search.

| Org.Name | Searches |
|------------------------|----------|
| Menifee CA PD | 654 |
| Banks County GA SO | 244 |
| La Habra CA PD | 138 |
| San Diego County CA SD | 100 |
| Los Angeles CA PD | 92 |
| Jefferson County AL SO | 67 |
| Butler Township OH PD | 66 |
| Orange County SO CA | 61 |
| Irvine CA PD | 58 |
| San Diego CA PD | 58 |
| Savannah PD - GA | 51 |
| Cobb County GA PD | 49 |
| Brookhaven GA PD | 45 |
| Midland TX PD | 43 |

Searches referencing Border Patrol or the border

Potentially problematic searches including USBP, border patrol, BP, border. 737 searches by 30 organizations. The vast majority were done by Riverside County CA SO.

**Organizations with Documented Immigration Searches
Who Accessed Woodland Cameras 2022-2026**

194 Total Organizations

| | | | | | |
|---|--------------------------|---|---|---------------------------------|---|
| [Federal] FBI [Inactive] | Cobb County GA PD | Genesee County MI SO | Little Elm TX PD | OK - 477 | Sarasota FL PD |
| Albany GA PD | Colorado State Patrol | Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) | Little Rock AR PD | Oklahoma City OK PD | Saratoga County NY SO |
| Altoona IA PD | Columbus OH PD | Gilroy CA PD | Los Angeles CA PD | Ontario CA PD | Savannah PD - GA |
| Anaheim CA PD | Concord CA PD | Glencoe IL PD | Los Angeles County CA SD | Orange CA PD | Scottsdale AZ PD |
| Anderson CA PD | Costa Mesa CA PD | Glendale CA PD | Louisiana Bureau of Investigation | Orange County (CA) DA Office | Seal Beach CA PD |
| Argo AL PD | Cranston RI PD | Greenville County SC SO | Louisville Metro KY PD | Orange County FL SO | Skokie IL PD |
| Arizona Department of Public Safety | Culver City CA PD | Hanover Park IL PD | Loves Park IL PD | Orange County SO CA | South Carolina Law Enforcement Division - SLED |
| Azusa CA PD | Dallas TX PD | Harrisonburg VA PD | Lowndes County GA SO | Orlando FL PD | South Sioux City NE PD |
| Bakersfield CA PD | Danville CA PD | Hays County TX SO | Maricopa AZ PD | Oro Valley AZ PD | Spokane County WA SO |
| Baldwin Park CA PD | Deerfield IL PD | Hemet CA PD | Maricopa County AZ SO | Osceola County FL SO | Springville PD (UT) |
| Banks County GA SO | Delaware State Police | Henrico County VA PD | Marysville MI PD | Palm Springs CA PD | St. Joseph County SO IN |
| Bay County FL SO | Denton TX PD | Hermosa Beach PD CA | Medina County OH SO | Parma OH PD | St. Lucie County FL SO |
| Beaumont CA PD | Dona Ana County NM SO | Hoover AL PD | Menifee CA PD | Peachtree City GA PD | Sterling Heights MI PD |
| Bernalillo County NM SO | Dublin CA PD (ACSO) | Houston TX PD | Miami-Dade FL SO | Perkins Township OH PD | Suffolk County NY PD |
| Beverly Hills CA PD | El Cajon CA PD | Imperial City CA PD | Midland TX PD | Phoenix AZ PD | Taylorsville UT PD |
| Breckenridge Hills MO PD | El Centro CA PD | Imperial County CA SO | Milwaukee WI PD | Pinal County AZ SO | Tempe AZ PD |
| Brookhaven GA PD | El Monte CA PD | Irvine CA PD | Missouri State Highway Patrol | Port Huron MI PD | Terrebonne Parish LA SO |
| Burbank CA PD | Elizabethton TN PD | Irwindale CA PD | MOCIC | Prosper TX PD | Titusville FL PD |
| Burleson TX PD | Elk Grove CA PD | Isle Of Wight County VA SO | Montclair CA PD | Putnam County FL SO | Tulsa OK PD |

| | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|---|----------------------------|
| Butler Township OH PD | Elkhart PD IN | Jackson County OR SO | Montgomery County OH SO | Rialto PD CA | Twinsburg OH PD |
| CAC - NYC NY | Escondido CA PD | Jefferson County AL SO | Mounds View MN PD | Riverside County CA District Attorney | University of Iowa PD (IA) |
| California Department of Corrections | Fairfax County VA PD | Jefferson Parish LA SO | Mustang OK PD | Riverside County CA SO | Van Buren AR PD |
| California Highway Patrol | Farmington Hills MI PD | Kentucky State KY PD | Napa County CA SO | Rocky Mountain Information Network (RMIN/RISS) AZ [DEACTIVATED] | Volusia County FL SO |
| Carrollton GA PD | Fayette County GA SO | Kings County Sheriff's Office CA | Naperville IL PD | Roseville CA PD | Walton County FL SO |
| Cartersville GA PD | Fish and Wildlife Commission FL PD | Kings Mountain NC PD | NCRIC | Round Rock TX PD | Waterford Township MI PD |
| Castle Rock CO PD | Flagler County FL SO | Klamath Falls OR PD | New York State Police NY | San Bernardino County CA SO | West Covina CA PD |
| Cathedral City CA PD | Florida Highway Patrol | La Habra CA PD | Newport Beach PD CA | San Diego CA PD | Westminster CA PD |
| Chaffee County CO SO | Forsyth County GA SO | Lake St. Louis MO PD | North TX Anti-Gang Center (TAG) | San Diego County CA SD | Whiteville NC PD |
| Chamblee GA PD | Fort Worth TX PD | Lantana FL PD | Northbrook IL PD | San Francisco District Attorney CA | Williamson County TX SO |
| Charlotte Mecklenburg NC PD | Fullerton CA PD | Laporte County IN SO | Oak Ridge TN PD | San Jose CA PD | |
| Chesterfield County VA PD | Fulton County GA SO | Laurens SC PD | Oconee County SC SO | San Mateo County CA SO | |
| Chula Vista CA PD | Fulton MS PD | Leeds AL PD | Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles (Ohio DPS) | Sandy Springs GA PD | |
| Clayton MO PD | Galveston County TX SO | Lewisville TX PD | Ohio State Highway Patrol | Santa Clara DA CA | |

Federal Access

Nearly 15,000 searches by federal agencies were recorded in Woodland's Flock system. Each search queried an average of 3,392 Flock camera networks simultaneously.

| Federal Agency | Search Count |
|---|--------------|
| FBI (now marked Inactive) | 7,565 |
| ATF Nashville TN (now Inactive) | 5,996 |
| ATF Louisville KY (now Inactive) | 657 |
| US GSA Office of Inspector General | 330 |
| National Park Service TN (Inactive) | 280 |
| Langley VA Air Force Base | 76 |
| US Postal Inspection Service | 14 |
| United States Border Control - Grand Forks Sector MN - DO NOT USE | 10 |
| Roudebush Medical Center IN Veterans Affairs PD | 3 |
| Indiana Dunes National Park IN PD | 44 |
| The Presidio Trust CA - US Park Police | 4 |

- **11 Federal agencies searched** Woodland PD Flock data (not including corporations that share data with federal agencies)
- **Federal agencies were directly accessing Woodland PD Flock data for ~2.5 years** (05/13/2022 to as recently as 10/07/2024)

Out-of-State Access

More than 3,000 out-of-state organizations directly accessed Woodland PD Flock data.

Out-of-state organizations ran searches for more than three years, from 04/13/2022 to 07/24/2025 (not counting the Flock Safety company itself). **A total of 3,899 non-California organizations accessed Woodland PD's Flock data.**

Top 10 states by number of searches

| Rank | State | Total Searches (all years) |
|------|------------|----------------------------|
| 1 | California | 798,8709 |
| 2 | Texas | 842,797 |
| 3 | Georgia | 328,017 |
| 4 | Illinois | 220,042 |
| 5 | Florida | 179,714 |
| 6 | Indiana | 155,600 |
| 7 | Ohio | 100,396 |
| 8 | Michigan | 85,427 |
| 9 | Virginia | 74,056 |
| 10 | Tennessee | 71,338 |

There were 2,632,310 searches by out-of-state organizations. This includes the federal government, other states, corporate entities, Flock Safety itself, unknown organizations where the name of the organization is not revealed, and accesses from FedEx PD and Union Pacific Railroad PD. Tribal law enforcement was counted according to the state the organization was located in, e.g., Blue Lake Rancheria Tribal PD was indexed as CA and Catawba Nation Tribal SC PD was indexed as SC.

Approximately one quarter of the total searches on Woodland's Flock data were made by out-of-state organizations.

| State | Total Searches | Percentage |
|--------|----------------|------------|
| CA | 7,988,709 | 75.2% |
| Non-CA | 2,632,310 | 24.8% |

Of particular note, three of these >3000 organizations were **still accessing Woodland PD's Flock data in 2025**:

Active Access in 2025

| Organization | Searches in 2025 |
|--------------------------|------------------|
| Houston TX PD | 235,793 |
| New York State Police NY | 12,627 |
| Sauk Village IL PD | 404 |

Houston TX PD: Immigration & Federal Enforcement Searches

- 417 searches explicitly citing immigration enforcement: “immigration,” “Immigration enforcement,” “HSI Investigation” (7), “HSI Inv” (3), “hsi warrant” (3), “HSINEX RFI” (official HSI referral number).
- 100 searches citing federal agencies: FBI Buffalo Assist (63), ATF invest (40+), FBI warrants (13), JTTF Investigation (7 — Joint Terrorism Task Force / FBI), US Marshals (2), DEA operations.
- Each Houston search queried up to 6,849 Flock networks. As Woodland’s cameras came online, they joined these network pools.

It appears the Houston TX PD is operating as an active federal enforcement conduit on the Flock platform. When it queries 6,849 networks per search on behalf of HSI or the FBI, those searches reach California cameras — a direct violation of SB 34.

Examples of California Organizations making searches on behalf of other states

| ID | Org.Name | Total.Network s.Searched | Time.Frame | Reason | Search. Time | Search. Type |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|--|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------|
| fd4a4436-3d72-4e9a-a35d-eda0ef9f240f | Riverside County CA SO | 1218 | 09/14/2025, 03:40:26 PM UTC 10/14/2025, 03:40:26 PM UTC | mike.garcia@dac.state.ok.us | 10/14/2025, 03:40:29 PM UTC | lookup |
| c0b2a808-c995-4dcc-9aba-bd652640c1ad | San Jose CA PD | 185 | 12/11/2025, 03:30:29 PM UTC 12/11/2025, 05:30:29 PM UTC | Durango CO Request | 12/11/2025, 05:28:24 PM UTC | lookup |

Vague Search

Aside from other versions of "investigation", other reasons were:

- "Work"
- "Reason"
- "POLICE REASONS"
- "work shit"
- "sunday funday"
- "Cool"
- "no reason"
- "for fun"
- "zzzzzz" (many variations using the string of "z")
- "Because", "BECAUSE I CAN"
- "Curious"
- "lol", "haha", "lmfao"
- " " ← A blank space was entered as a search reason over 22,000 times
- "&'(&&&)(*++", "- ", "" ← Various symbols entered as search reason
- "n/a", "N/A", "NA", "na", "none"

Note: This is by no means a comprehensive list

Protest

At least 231 times, the reason for a search included "protest" or "protester". One additional search had the reason "no king" on the day of the No Kings protests, June 14, 2025.

Reasons given included "Protest", "Protestor", "Immigration Protest", "ICE PROTEST", "SF PROTEST", "gene autry protest", "June 14th protests", "armed protest", and "israel protest intel".

As of Feb 19, 2026, the most recent organizations to use this search were Roseville CA PD on 01/24/2026 with the reason "Other - PROTESTS" and Irvine CA PD on 02/07/2026 with the reason "Other - veh seen at protest".

Former [Oath Keeper](#) and announced candidate for the 2026 California gubernatorial race, Chad Bianco is the Sheriff of Riverside County. He's vowed to work with ICE and [filed a lawsuit over California's SB 54](#). He [called "No Kings" protesters" paid for domestic terrorists."](#) The Riverside County CA SO ran a large proportion of the searches.

A total of 21 different organizations searched using protest related terms.

| Organization | Searches | Networks per Search | Listed "Reason" |
|-----------------------------|----------|---------------------|---|
| Riverside County CA SO | 46 | 917–993 | 'pprotest,' 'city protests,' 'cat city protests,' 'PROTESTS' |
| Irvine CA PD | 19 | 765–1,500 | 'Other - veh seen at protest' |
| San Bernardino County CA SO | 23 | 715–864 | 'ICE PROTEST,' 'rc hotel protest,' 'Devore Shelter protest' |
| Anaheim CA PD | 13 | 770–892 | 'gene autry protest,' 'scb protest bmw' |
| Escondido CA PD | 28 | 414–660 | 'protest,' 'Immigration Protest,' '2/2/25 Protest ATI Vehicle' |
| Daly City CA PD | 5 | 776 | 'SF PROTEST' (June 2025) |
| California Highway Patrol | 2 | 889–1,003 | '405 PC, Riverside protest, RPD assist,' 'possible protest suspect' |
| Roseville CA PD | 1 | 114 | 'Other - PROTESTS' |

| Out-of-State Searches | | | |
|-------------------------------|----------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Organization | Searches | Networks per Search | Listed "Reason" |
| Williamsburg VA PD | 61 | 3,567–3,595 | 'armed protest' |
| Roanoke TX PD | 8 | Not shown | 'protest' (2024) |
| Fairfax County VA PD | 3 | Not shown | 'protest' (2024) |
| Emory University Campus PD GA | 3 | 2,818 | 'Protest' (April 2023) |
| Carmel IN PD | 1 | Not shown | 'protest' (2024) |

“Make Your Own Case” / MYOC

Some organizations entered 'Make Your Own Case' (MYOC) as the stated reason for searching Woodland PD data, indicating searches initiated without a specific incident or victim, a proactive surveillance use case.

| Organization | Searches | Networks per Search | Listed “Reason” |
|-------------------|----------|---------------------|--|
| Chesterton IN PD | 83 | 4,291 | 'MYOC SIG60,' 'NARCOTICS MYOC,' 'MYOC/ FOLLOWING CHILD AROUND LIBRARY/,' 'MYOC- SUS PRIOR NOT R/O' |
| Villa Park IL PD | 27 | 4,064 | 'myoc ruse,' 'myoc' |
| Will County IL SO | 14 | 3,773 | 'MYOC PCS,' 'MYOC 10-99 FTA Traffic,' 'MYOC Natveeinvestigation Edwards' |
| Lisle IL PD | 7 | Not shown | 'myoc' |
| Wood Dale IL PD | 7 | Not shown | 'myoc' |
| Evanston IL PD | 7 | 4,985 | 'MYOC/Dia'ainte Campbell girlfriend vehicle,' 'MYOC/Agg. Assault with Firearm,' 'narcotics inv. MYOC' |

Organization and Corporation Access

Woodland's Flock data was accessed by a wide range of entities, including local, state, federal, and international organizations (including approximately 1,400 federal agency accounts).

| Organization | Notes on Org. | Searches |
|---|--|----------|
| MAGLOCLEN RISS | Serving Delaware, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia, as well as Canada and England. https://www.riss.net/centers/magloclen/ | 74 |
| Rocky Mountain Information Network (RMIN/RISS) AZ [DEACTIVATED] | Serving Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, as well as parts of Canada. https://www.riss.net/centers/rmin/ | 244 |
| MOCIC | Serving Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin, as well as parts of Canada. https://www.riss.net/centers/mocic/ | 2035 |
| NESPIN - New England State Police Information Network | Serving Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont, as well as parts of Canada. https://www.riss.net/centers/nespinn/ | 1572 |
| TN ROCIC | Serving Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia, as well as Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. https://www.riss.net/centers/rocic/ | 802 |
| National Center for Missing & Exploited Children [NCMEC] | The National Center for Missing & Exploited Children is a private, non-profit 501(c)(3) corporation whose mission is to help find missing children, reduce child sexual exploitation, and prevent child victimization. NCMEC works with families, victims, private industry, law enforcement, and the public to assist with preventing child abductions, recovering missing children, and providing services to deter and combat child sexual exploitation. https://www.missingkids.org/home | 212 |
| Westport Regional Business League (MO) | https://westportkcmo.com/ | 3 |

Unknown Organization Access

Woodland's Flock data was accessed by organization names that indicated they weren't to be used, were inactivated, etc but with no indication of their previous name. If there was originally a different name, it can't be determined now from the audit log. Each of these organizations searched on Woodland PD data.

| Org Name | Searches |
|---------------------|----------|
| [DEACTIVATED] - DNU | 2,048 |
| do not use | 14 |
| DNU | 1 |
| DNU25 | 519 |
| Inactive | 7 |
| Decommissioned Org | 130 |

Woodland PD ALPR Policy

The following are highlights from Woodland PD ALPR Guidelines and Woodland PD Policy Manual.

"No ALPR operator may access department, state or federal data unless otherwise authorized to do so." (Section 441.4(e))

REALITY: The audit and supplemental datasets document searches referencing FBI, ATF, DEA, HSI, USPS Inspection Service, DOJ, and other federal agencies — either through direct federal accounts or through California agencies explicitly citing federal requests as their search reason. Audit findings show numerous agencies as direct examples of federal-purpose access running through the system Woodland's policy is supposed to govern.

IMPLICATION: The policy prohibits unauthorized federal data access. The audit shows federal-purpose access occurring on the network Woodland joined. Whether Woodland "authorized" this is itself the question — the policy suggests they did not intend to, but the system architecture made it happen anyway.

"ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law, using the following procedures: (a) The agency makes a written request... (b) The request is reviewed by the ALPR Administrator... (c) The approved request is retained on file." (Section 441.7)

REALITY: This procedure describes a deliberate, request-by-request approval process for data sharing. January 2026 alone, the audit shows 507,341 searches by outside agencies in a single month. If Woodland's ALPR Administrator reviewed and approved even a fraction of those, it would constitute a full-time job. In practice, access is granted through Flock's network architecture — not through Woodland's written request and approval process.

IMPLICATION: This is the single sharpest gap between policy and reality. The policy imagines a controlled, documented sharing process. The audit shows mass, automated, continuous access by hundreds of organizations. The policy procedure described in Section 441.7 was never operationally possible given how Flock's network actually works.

"ALPR system audits should be conducted on a regular basis." (Section 441.6)
And from the ALPR Guidelines: "System audits shall be conducted by the Patrol Lieutenant no less than annually."

REALITY: The audit data that revealed thousands-organizational access, hundreds of thousands searches, protest surveillance patterns, and federal-agency-referencing search reasons were obtained by a public records request, not released proactively by Woodland PD through its own audit process. There is little to no public record of Woodland PD having conducted or published an internal audit since the cameras went live.

IMPLICATION: If internal audits were occurring, the department would have seen the same data the community saw. The Woodland City Council would have been informed. The fact that this information surfaced through a public records request rather than internal reporting suggests either the audits were not conducted, or their findings were not shared with the City Council.

*"All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department."
(Section 441.2, Policy statement)*

REALITY: The January 2026 audit shows 507,341 of 507,765 searches (99.92%) were conducted by agencies other than Woodland PD. The data is functionally operating as a shared regional and statewide resource — not for the "official use of this department.

IMPLICATION: This is not a minor gap. The policy's foundational premise — that the system exists for Woodland PD's own use — is contradicted by the ratio at which the data is actually used. The Council approved a system described as a local law enforcement tool. The policy says the same. The audit shows otherwise.

Email Exchange Between Lt. Parsons and Motorola/Vigilant (February 2022)

In February 2022, Lt. Heath Parsons, who presented the Flock contract to the Council on February 3, 2026, emailed a Motorola/Vigilant sales representative to share SB 34's definition of "public agency." His note references a legal briefing from the California Chiefs of Police Association's legal adviser, Jim Touchstone of Jones and Mayer Law Firm, who acknowledged that California courts were "leaning towards agreeing that it means California only."

Why this matters: In October 2023, California Attorney General Rob Bonta confirmed that interpretation in a published bulletin, stating that the definition of "public agency" is limited to California state and local agencies, and that the prohibition on sharing ALPR data applies to shared vendor databases like Flock's network. That bulletin was issued more than two years before the Council's February 3rd vote.

The department was aware of this legal question no later than February 2022. The Attorney General resolved it on the record in October 2023. When Lt. Parsons presented the Flock extension contract to the Council in February 2026, neither the department's prior awareness of this legal issue nor the Attorney General's subsequent guidance was part of that presentation. The Council voted without information the department already had.

Woodland and Federal ALPR Sharing

Preface: Note on a previous public records request done November 2022 for Woodland PD ALPR data

<https://www.muckrock.com/foi/woodland-3513/automated-license-plate-readers-woodland-police-department-136242/#comms>

Note that a previous public records request was done for Woodland PD ALPR data on 11/02/2022 by Dave Maass of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF).

The Motorola Solutions/Vigilant VehicleManager record showed Woodland PD was sharing data at that time with many out of state agencies and organizations. This included federal agencies like the CBP-NTC, ATF, DHS - HSI, Drug Enforcement Administration, US Postal Inspection Service, United States Marshals Service, United States Forest Service CA, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

The response written by the police department for Flock listed only California "agencies and organizations with which Woodland PD shares ALPR data through FLOCK". This was within the general time period in which we saw data sharing by Woodland PD with both other states and federal agencies. We weren't able to see the organizations Woodland PD was sharing Flock data with for that month in the new audit, however, because the November 2022 network log was missing from the records we received.

Based on the results of the November 2022 public records request EFF, **ACLU NorCal and ACLU SoCal sent a letter to Woodland PD in May of 2023 demanding they "immediately stop sharing automated license plate reader (ALPR) data with law enforcement agencies in other states because it violates California law and could enable prosecution of abortion seekers and providers elsewhere."**

<https://www.aclunorcal.org/press-releases/civil-liberties-groups-demand-california-police-stop-sharing-drivers-location-data-police-anti/>

California SB 34 and 54 (2015)

What SB 34 Is

Senate Bill 34 (Chapter 532, Statutes of 2015), authored by Senator Jerry Hill, became effective January 1, 2016. It established the first comprehensive California framework governing the collection, storage, use, and sharing of automated license plate recognition (ALPR) data. It is codified at California Civil Code §§ 1798.90.5 through 1798.90.55.

The following definitions are taken directly from Civil Code § 1798.90.5:

§ 1798.90.5(b): *"Automated license plate recognition information," or "ALPR information" means information or data collected through the use of an ALPR system.*

§ 1798.90.5(d): *"Automated license plate recognition system" or "ALPR system" means a searchable computerized database resulting from the operation of one or more mobile or fixed cameras combined with computer algorithms to read and convert images of registration plates and the characters they contain into computer-readable data.*

§ 1798.90.5(f): *"Public agency" means the state, any city, county, or city and county, or any agency or political subdivision of the state or a city, county, or city and county, including, but not limited to, a law enforcement agency.*

The definition of 'public agency' is foundational to what follows: it is explicitly limited to California state and local entities. Federal law enforcement agencies (FBI, ATF, ICE, HSI, CBP, DEA, GSA OIG) and out-of-state law enforcement agencies (Houston TX PD, New York State Police) do not meet this definition. This is not ambiguous — it was confirmed in writing by the California Attorney General in 2023.

The Attorney General's 2023 Clarification

In October 2023, California Attorney General Rob Bonta issued Information Bulletin 2023-DLE-06 specifically because California law enforcement agencies were violating SB 34 by sharing ALPR data with federal and out-of-state agencies — often through Flock Safety's platform. The bulletin's language is direct:

AG Bonta, [Bulletin 2023-DLE-06](#): *Importantly, the definition of 'public agency' is limited to state or local agencies, including law enforcement agencies, and does not include out-of-state or federal law enforcement agencies. Accordingly, SB 34 does not permit California LEAs to share ALPR information with private entities or out-of-state or federal agencies, including out-of-state and federal law enforcement agencies.*

This prohibition applies to ALPR database(s) that LEAs access through private or public vendors who maintain ALPR information collected from multiple databases and/or public agencies.

That last sentence is critical for Woodland: the prohibition applies to shared databases accessed through vendors — i.e., Flock Safety's network. The violation is not limited to direct, intentional data hand-offs. Allowing access through a shared platform is itself a violation.

What SB 54 Is

Senate Bill 54 (Chapter 495, Statutes of 2017), authored by Senate President Pro Tem Kevin de León, became effective January 1, 2018. It is known as the California Values Act and is codified at Government Code §§ 7284 through 7284.12. Its purpose is to prevent California state and local law enforcement resources from being used to assist federal immigration enforcement.

SB 54's primary focus is on what California agencies do with people — detention, transfer, notification of release dates, and custodial access. Its application to ALPR data is less direct than SB 34's, but there is a meaningful overlap, particularly through its prohibition on using agency money or personnel to 'detect' persons for immigration enforcement purposes, and its bar on sharing 'personal information' with immigration authorities.

The core prohibitions are found in § 7284.6(a):

§ 7284.6(a): California law enforcement agencies shall not:

§ 7284.6(a)(1): *Use agency or department moneys or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes, including any of the following:*

§ 7284.6(a)(1)(A): *Inquiring into an individual's immigration status.*

§ 7284.6(a)(1)(D): *Providing personal information, as defined in Section 1798.3 of the Civil Code, about an individual, including, but not limited to, the individual's home address or work address unless that information is available to the public.*

'Personal information' is defined by cross-reference to Civil Code § 1798.3. That section defines personal information broadly to include any information that 'identifies or describes an individual,' including their address and movement. Notably, SB 34 itself classifies ALPR data as personal information — it was added to the Civil Code § 1798.29 definition of personal information by the same legislation.

The word 'detect' in § 7284.6(a)(1) is important. ALPR systems are surveillance tools that detect vehicle movements — and by extension, the movements of persons. When a California agency uses

Flock to 'detect' the presence or movements of a vehicle in response to an HSI or ICE request, the question of whether that constitutes using agency personnel to 'detect persons for immigration enforcement purposes' is a live legal question.

The Values Act's Definition of Immigration Enforcement

§ 7284.4(f): *"Immigration enforcement" includes any and all efforts to investigate, enforce, or assist in the investigation or enforcement of any federal civil immigration law, and also includes any and all efforts to investigate, enforce, or assist in the investigation or enforcement of any federal criminal immigration law.*

This definition is expansive: it covers not just arrests and detentions, but any effort to 'assist in the investigation or enforcement' of immigration law. Running a Flock search at the explicit request of an HSI agent — as the search reasons in the audit data show — is, on its face, assisting in the investigation of federal immigration law.

SB 54 — VIOLATION ANALYSIS BY FINDING

The SB 54 analysis is more nuanced than SB 34. SB 34's violation is structural: the data either did or did not flow to a prohibited recipient. SB 54 depends on purpose: was the agency action taken to assist in immigration enforcement? The audit findings provides strong circumstantial evidence of this — officers entered the purpose themselves in the search reason field. But final determination requires confirmation of whether results were used for immigration enforcement.

Senator Wyden Findings on Flock

In November 2025, U.S. Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) released findings from his investigation into Flock Safety's security practices, and the results are alarming.

Key findings:

- Flock does not require multi-factor authentication for law enforcement accounts
- At least 35 customer account passwords were stolen by hackers
- Stolen credentials are being sold on the dark web
- Data exposed to "hackers, foreign spies, and criminals"

Below is the letter sent to the FTC on November 3, 2025 authored by Ron Wyden, United States Senator, and Raja Krishnamoorthi, Member of Congress.

Dear Chair Ferguson:

We write to request that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigate Flock Safety ("Flock"), the license plate surveillance camera company, and, where appropriate, hold the company responsible for its negligent cybersecurity practices. Flock's surveillance data can reveal Americans' movements over time, including trips to doctors and therapists, support group meetings for alcohol or drug addiction, as well as places of worship and protests. By not requiring industry-standard multi-factor authentication (MFA) to secure law enforcement accounts, Flock has needlessly exposed Americans' sensitive personal data captured by the company's surveillance cameras to theft by hackers and foreign spies, and unauthorized access through multiple documented instances of unauthorized password sharing.

Flock operates the largest network of surveillance cameras in the United States, reportedly contracting with over 5,000 police departments, 1,000 businesses, and numerous homeowners associations across 49 states. When a vehicle passes by a Flock camera, Flock records plate information, vehicle characteristics, and when and where the vehicle was spotted. Flock's network of surveillance cameras generate and store billions of vehicle scans each month. Flock reportedly enables law enforcement to search through this data not just by plate number, but also by make, model, and even bumper stickers.

In addition to being able to search data generated by cameras their agencies pay for, Flock's law enforcement customers can also search data collected by other Flock customers' cameras. Flock customers can allow access by specific law enforcement agencies and can also enroll into the "National Lookup Tool" which allows their data to be searched by all other enrolled Flock customers. Flock informed Congress this August that approximately 75% of Flock's law enforcement customers have opted into the National Lookup Tool, which is likely due to Flock restricting access to nationwide searches to agencies that have agreed to share their data. But because most law enforcement agency customers have access to this tool, hackers, foreign spies, or anyone else that gains access to a Flock customer account can misuse it to track Americans across the country.

Flock has unnecessarily exposed Americans' sensitive personal data to theft by hackers and foreign spies. While Flock offers support for MFA, a widely recognized cybersecurity best practice, Flock does not require it, which the company confirmed to Congress in October. Moreover, Flock continues to support insecure methods of MFA, such as sending a numeric code to a phone by text message, which is vulnerable to interception and phishing. Flock does not natively support phishing-resistant MFA, which the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency calls "the gold standard method of [MFA]." Phishing-resistant MFA is required of federal agencies and mandated by both the Federal Communications Commission and the FTC. Flock's failure to natively support and require phishing-resistant MFA means that if hackers or foreign spies steal, phish, or otherwise learn a law enforcement officer's Flock password, they can gain access to law-enforcement-only areas of Flock's website and search the billions of photos of Americans' license plates collected by taxpayer-funded cameras across the country. This threat is not theoretical. A search by Congressional staff of a public tool operated by the cybersecurity company Hudson Rock documenting accounts compromised by a form of malware known as an "infostealer" reveals that passwords for at least 35 Flock customer accounts have been stolen. Security researcher Benn Jordan also recently provided our offices with a screenshot from a Russian-language cybercrime forum in which Flock accounts appear to be offered for sale.

By not requiring MFA, Flock has also enabled unauthorized access through law enforcement officers sharing their Flock passwords. If Flock required MFA, law enforcement users of Flock would be required to approve each login to their account from a new computer. On August 11, 2025, Unraveled Press revealed that a Drug Enforcement Administration officer used the Flock account of a local police detective in Palos Heights, Illinois, to conduct several searches. Public records obtained by the press revealed that the detective confirmed that it was a common practice for members of a DEA task force that he was part of to use his login credentials to conduct Flock searches. That numerous federal agents were able to access Flock's systems using passwords belonging to other users without being detected or blocked raises serious questions about the effectiveness of Flock's cybersecurity defenses. A July 9, 2025, memo by the Palos Heights Deputy Chief of Police about the incident, which was released to the press, revealed that the department had not enabled the MFA option until after the password sharing was first identified by a reporter at 404 Media.

Flock's failure to require MFA is likely an unfair business practice prohibited by Section 5 of the FTC Act. In at least four cases — against Uber, Chegg, Drizly, and Blackbaud — the FTC held that failure to require MFA is an unfair business practice. Flock's negligent cybersecurity practices may also violate state laws related to data protection, consumer privacy or the use of automatic license plate reader (ALPR) systems; for example, California Civil Code § 1798.90.53 requires entities operating ALPR systems to "maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure."

Flock has received vast sums of taxpayer money to build a national surveillance network. But Flock's cavalier attitude towards cybersecurity needlessly exposes Americans to the threat of hackers and foreign spies tapping this data. Accordingly, we urge the FTC to hold Flock accountable for its negligent cybersecurity practices.

Technical Security

Lack of Basic Security

Published Dec 22, 2025, researcher Benn Jordan discovered 60+ Flock Condor cameras streaming live to the internet with no password required. Jordan also identified the lack of mandatory multi-factor authentication to be a high concern.

What Was Exposed:


- Live video feeds from across the country
- 30 days of archived video available for download
- Administrative control panels (could change settings, delete footage)
- **No encryption** on any data
- Footage included children playing on playground swings

How It Was Discovered: Simple search on Shodan (IoT search engine): “HTTP title Flock Admin”

Flock’s Response: Called it “limited misconfiguration on very small number of devices”

Below are images from Benn Jordan, researcher, reporting his findings of publicly accessible Flock Cameras per video report [“This Flock Camera Leaks is like Netflix For Stalkers”](#)


Image of Benn reading a statement captured through his discovery of a publicly accessible Flock camera



Benn's discovery of a publicly accessible camera facing a park while children are playing.



Benn's discovery of a publicly accessible Flock Admin Dashboard, with the ability to view past recordings.



Benn's fellow researcher shares his findings of public accessible Flock camera on Harris Road and Young Street outside of the Crossroads Business Park in **Bakersfield, California**.



Jon “GainSec” Gaines Findings

In a separate investigation, Benn Jordan and security researcher Jon “GainSec” Gaines demonstrated that an attacker with brief physical access to a Flock camera — such as anyone who could approach one mounted on a street pole — could compromise the device in under 30 seconds.

An independent technical teardown of Flock’s Falcon Flex camera (the ALPR model used for license plate reading) by researchers at EyesOffCR.org documented the following:

- The camera runs a debug version of Android 8.1, a software environment explicitly flagged as “unsafe for production use”
- The bootloader — the software that controls what the camera runs — is unlocked, meaning custom or malicious firmware can be installed without any bypass
- There is no package verifier, meaning the device will run any software installed on it without checking whether it is legitimate
- A hidden “diagnostic mode” broadcasts a Wi-Fi signal from the camera; the hardcoded password to access it is the word “security”
- Older units use unencrypted storage, meaning data can be extracted directly from a removed device
- Exposed USB ports and physical button combinations allow unauthorized wireless access

No Multi-Factor Authentication Required

- Flock Safety does not require multi-factor authentication (MFA) for law enforcement accounts — a basic security standard used by virtually every major online service
- At least 35 police department passwords were stolen by hackers

- Those stolen credentials are being sold on the dark web
- The exposed credentials leave Flock's network — and the data of every city on it — accessible to hackers, foreign intelligence services, and criminals

Summary Tech Issues:

- **Agencies with compromised credentials (confirmed):** At least 35 police departments nationwide
- **Where stolen passwords ended up:** For sale on the dark web
- **Basic protection Flock does not require:** Multi-factor authentication (MFA)

Other Cities With Flock Violations

Other Cities that have canceled, suspended, or further investigating Flock Safety as their ALPR vendor.

- Mountain View, CA
 - **Date of Action:** February, 2026
 - **Reason:** Unauthorized federal access (ATF KY/TN, Langley AFB, GSA OIG) discovered via audit; 250+ agencies had access; 600K searches over 17 months; Police Chief: "I personally no longer have confidence in this particular vendor"
- Santa Cruz, CA
 - **Date of Action:** January 13, 2026
 - **Reason:** 4,000+ immigration-related searches (Jun-Oct 2025); out-of-state agencies searched data; violated SB 34 and sanctuary protections; first CA city to terminate
- Los Altos Hills, CA
 - **Date of Action:** January 15, 2026
 - **Reason:** Out-of-state agencies searched data 1M+ times in 2024-2025; privacy concerns; part of Bay Area movement
- Oxnard, CA
 - **Date of Action:** February 27, 2026
 - **Reason:** Audit found US Postal Inspection Service accessed data Feb-Mar 2025 via unauthorized "National Lookup" feature
- Richmond, CA
 - **Date of Action:** Oct 2025 (suspended); Mar 2026 (vote failed)
 - **Reason:** Police Chief discovered "National Lookup" feature allowed outside agencies to access data; ATF accessed system March 2025 for immigration investigation; cameras turned off, council voted not to extend the contract on Mar 4, 2026
- Eugene, OR
 - **Date of Action:** December 6, 2025
 - **Reason:** Camera reactivated after city ordered shutdown (learned from community tipster, not Flock); "vulnerabilities and limitations"; sanctuary law concerns. Nationwide lookup was enabled without notification to city
- Springfield, OR
 - **Date of Action:** December 6, 2025
 - **Reason:** Same concerns as Eugene; cameras never fully operational but were inadvertently activated
- Bend, OR
 - **Date of Action:** January 8, 2026
 - **Reason:** Federal compliance concerns; sanctuary law; security issues; Reddit-organized community campaign; Benn Jordan video influence
- Talent, OR
 - **Date of Action:** December 17, 2025
 - **Reason:** Oregon sanctuary law concerns; potential immigration enforcement misuse

- Lane County, OR
 - **Date of Action:** December 10, 2025
 - **Reason:** Following Eugene/Springfield; cameras never installed; regional network not viable without them
- Woodburn, OR
 - **Date of Action:** Nov 13, 2025 (suspended); Feb 2026 (audit revealed violations)
 - **Reason:** Community ICE concerns; audit later revealed DHS searched data 175 times (Mar-May 2025), Border Patrol 209 times (May-Jun 2025) - total 384 federal searches
- Olympia, WA
 - **Date of Action:** December 3, 2025
 - **Reason:** 200 attended Dec 2 protest rally; federal data misuse fears; sanctuary concerns
- Redmond, WA
 - **Date of Action:** November 1, 2025
 - **Reason:** ICE arrests near camera locations; court ruling that Flock data is public record; seeking legal review
- Skamania County, WA
 - **Date of Action:** November 12, 2025
 - **Reason:** Court decision on public records access threatens public safety per sheriff
- Flagstaff, AZ
 - **Date of Action:** December 16, 2025
 - **Reason:** Month of community pushback; CEO Becky Daggett: community outrage over privacy in "new era" of AI
- Sedona, AZ
 - **Date of Action:** August 1, 2025
 - **Reason:** Community pressure; resident Sandy Boyce organized via livefreeaz.com; "building our own prisons and paying for it"
- Cambridge, MA
 - **Date of Action:** December 11, 2025
 - **Reason:** Flock installed 2 cameras WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION after city ordered suspension Oct 20; "material breach of trust"; federal abortion/immigration data access fears
- Staunton, VA
 - **Date of Action:** Dec 19, 2025 (announced); Jan 8, 2026 (effective)
 - **Reason:** CEO Garrett Langley's inflammatory email to Police Chief calling critics "activist groups who want to defund police"; Chief Williams response: "democracy in action"
- Evanston, IL
 - **Date of Action:** Aug 26, 2025 (announced); Sept 26, 2025 (effective)
 - **Reason:** IL State audit found Flock shared data with US Customs & Border Protection, violating state law; Flock later TRIED TO REINSTALL cameras without permission; city covered them with plastic

- Oak Park, IL
 - **Date of Action:** August 5, 2025
 - **Reason:** Federal immigration agents' potential access would violate village sanctuary ordinance; IL state investigation; Trustee Derek Eder's influential blog post
- Austin, TX
 - **Date of Action:** June 1, 2025
 - **Reason:** 30+ community groups coalition (including EFF-Austin); audit found 20%+ of searches lacked documentation; contract not renewed
- Hillsborough, NC
 - **Date of Action:** Oct 27, 2025 (decided); Dec 3, 2025 (cameras removed)
 - **Reason:** Contract language allowed Flock to disclose data to any government entity with "good faith belief"; only 5 of 10 cameras installed when canceled
- Scarsdale, NY
 - **Date of Action:** August 1, 2025
 - **Reason:** Resident Josh Frankel's FOIA campaign and petition (400+ signatures); concerns about national data sharing (Des Moines IA police could see Scarsdale, vice versa)
- Charlottesville, VA
 - **Date of Action:** Dec 2025-Jan 2026
 - **Reason:** 10-camera pilot program expired Oct 2025; cameras removed; disconnected from national network Jun 2025 due to ICE concerns
- Gig Harbor, WA
 - **Date of Action:** March 2025
 - **Reason:** City Council voted against usage per public comment and privacy concerns
- Verona, WI
 - **Date of Action:** February 2026
 - **Reason:** A lack of public trust in Flock Safety, audit findings of vague search reasons and likely abuse of Flock system
- Hays County, TX
 - **Date of Action:** October 1, 2025
 - **Reason:** Commissioner Michelle Cohen: "It's more about the company's practices versus the technology"
- San Marcos, TX
 - **Date of Action:** December 1, 2025
 - **Reason:** Council deadlocked 3-3; contract allowed to lapse; Mayor Jane Hughson: "I prefer it not be Flock brand"
- Mountlake Terrace, WA
 - **Date of Action:** November 1, 2025
 - **Reason:** Unanimously canceled
- Lynnwood, WA
 - **Date of Action:** November 1, 2025
 - **Action:** Cameras deactivated

- Windsor, CT
 - **Date of Action:** Early 2026
 - **Reason:** Voted 8-1 to shut off cameras pending policy alignment
- Denver, CO
 - **Date of Action:** May 2025 (council); ongoing
 - **Reason:** City Council voted DOWN extension May 2025, but Mayor Mike Johnston unilaterally approved continuation; drew ACLU Colorado criticism
- Cupertino, CA
 - **Date of Action:** February 25, 2026
 - **Reason:** Santa Clara County Board voted 3-2 to prohibit Sheriff from using/operating Flock cameras in Cupertino, Saratoga, Los Altos Hills
- Saratoga, CA
 - **Date of Action:** February 25, 2026
 - **Reason:** Same Santa Clara County action as Cupertino
- El Cerrito, CA
 - **Date of Action:** Ongoing 2025-2026
 - **Reason:** Audit found FBI, ATF, GSA OIG, US Postal Inspection, VA Police accessed data without authorization (2023-2025)
- Seneca, MO
 - **Date of Action:** Mid October 2025
 - **Reason:** Police Chief Altic expressed concerns about reports of camera misuse throughout the country and assistance from Flock's customer service team.

Questions Woodland Community Need to Know

- In May of 2023, ACLU NorCal and ACLU SoCal discovered California Civil Code (SB 34) violations and sent notifications demanding to stop sharing ALPR data that violates the code. Why did Woodland PD ignore this notification?
- Why did Woodland PD allow 2.5 years of direct Federal and out-of-state access? What actions did Woodland PD take when this access occurred, and why was the City Council not informed?
- Out-of-state organizations conducted over 2.6 million searches on Woodland's Flock data. How many of those searches queried vehicles registered to Woodland residents, and will the city provide that information?
- Houston TX PD conducted hundreds of searches explicitly citing immigration enforcement agencies (HSI, FBI, ATF). Under SB 34, sharing data with federal agencies is prohibited regardless of which agency initiates the request. Did Woodland PD ever object to or flag these searches?
- The audit shows that as recently as February 2026, agencies were still using search reasons referencing HSI and DHS when querying Woodland's data. Does Woodland PD monitor search reasons in real time, and does it have a mechanism to block or flag searches that appear to be conducted on behalf of federal agencies?
- Why weren't the security vulnerabilities documented by Senator Wyden and independent researchers disclosed to the council before the February 3rd vote?
- Has Woodland been notified by Flock Safety whether any of the 35+ agencies with compromised credentials had access to Woodland's network?
- If Flock describes these failures as "misconfigurations" rather than systemic problems, what specific verification exists that Woodland's cameras are configured correctly?
- Why, per Woodland PD's own operating guidelines with Flock, does Woodland PD not require multi-factor authentication? What security measures are there that Woodland PD and the shared organizations are in place to ensure access is by intended personnel?